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I. INTRODUCTION 
The justifications given by states that resort to the right of 
self-defense, under international law, are often unreasonable. Article 
511 of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) adopts a passive 
interpretation of the right of self-defense because it ignores opinio juris 
in giving justification to the right of self-defense in international law. 
It instead relies strictly on the static and narrow approach of state 
practice. In practice, the idea of state practice makes room for 
dominant states to create broad interpretations and resort to a use of 
force, by characterizing the action as self-defense, under Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. This resort to the right of self-defense has the 
                                                 
 1 U.N. Charter art. 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defensce if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defensce shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.” 
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potential to be driven by professionally impeccable legal arguments 
that look from rules to a dominant state’s underlying reasons. 
As international law suffers from a lack of harmonized 
standards in norm-identification – dominant states find room to 
pursue their self-interested interpretations in practice. Through this 
flaw, dominant actors are potentially capable of putting non-
dominant states under pressure to keep in pace with their proposals 
in practice. If non-dominant actors wish to remain viable on the 
international plane and not be subject to a wide range of restrictive 
measures, they will find no alternative other than voting for, or 
abstaining from, proposals rendered by dominant actors. In other 
words, “the major states will always have an influence commensurate 
with their status, if only because their concerns are much wider, their 
interests much deeper and their power more effective.”2 
The hazard of this customary law-Charter puzzle looms large 
in the era of the creation of the international core crime of 
Aggression in 2017. This state of affairs makes room for dominant 
states to tag and taint other non-dominant states with the label of 
having committed the crime of Aggression. This article proposes that 
there is a necessity to re-conceptualize the right of self-defense in 
international law. This task will require an understanding of the basic 
definition of the crime of Aggression and its applicability in 2017. 
This article is structured in the following order: Part II is 
dedicated to both the evolutionary process of the right of self-
defense in international law and also different schools of thought 
among international law scholarship in this regard. Part III delves 
into the constitutive elements of the crime of Aggression – its actus 
reus3 and mens rea4 requirements. This part also puts emphasizes the 
intrinsic interconnectedness of the crime of Agression with the right 
of self-defense in international law. And Part IV features the final 
remarks of the article. 
                                                 
 2 MALCOLM NATHAN SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (7th ed, 2014). 
 3 Latin for guilty act. 
 4 Latin for guilty mind. 
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II. THE GENEALOGY OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
International law generally prohibits the use of force unless 
such an action is borne out of the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense, or is authorized by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Calling for a universal respect 
toward the sovereignty of all member states, Article 2 (4)5 of the UN 
Charter articulates the prohibition of use of force under international 
law. On the other hand, Chapter VII of the UN Charter on “Action 
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and the 
Acts of Aggression”, delineates what would constitute an appropriate 
response to an actual threat to the peace. Article 51 of Chapter VII 
articulates the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in 
case of an actual armed attack posed by a rogue entity against any of 
the members of the Charter. Thus, “the use of force by one state 
against another [on behalf of the fulfillment of the right to individual 
or collective self-defense] is one of the most significant foreign policy 
decisions that any State can make.”6 
Realistically speaking, history has been fraught with 
persuading evidence of the reliance of dominant member states on 
hard power, under state-centric realistic approaches toward inter-
polity relations, in order to fulfill their political desires.7 This was 
founded upon a Hobbesian approach toward inter-polity relations. 
This approach states that there is no super-sovereign on an inter-
polity plane that may enforce agreements among states, and 
therefore, states are recognized as having a legal permission to resort 
to war against other states. This is indicative of the fact that the 
theory of just war during the 19th century’s international legal 
                                                 
 5 U.N. Charter art. 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.” 
 6 Donald R Rothwell, Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International 
Terrorism, 24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 337, 338 (2005). 
 7 See generally JOHN BAYLIS, STEVE SMITH & PATRICIA OWENS, THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (5th ed., 2013). 
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scholarship lacked morality.8 In practice, states applied this approach 
to launch war as a prerogative en route to their political and 
economic ends. 
There have been a plethora of incidents around the world 
addressing the right of self-defense, as one of the two justifications 
for a legal use of force, recognized in the aftermath of World War II. 
But, there is still considerable controversy surrounding a modern 
formulation of the customary-Charter nature of the right of self-
defense. In fact, the primary concern is not the legality of the 
international laws of self-defense, for it intrinsically is an inherent 
right of self-help.9 Rather, the main concern is the extent to which 
they apply and “rather springs from a proportionate identification of 
the circumstances under which it [the law of self-defense] applies.”10 
The extent to which international laws of self-defense apply 
has long been conceptually controversial. This issue has been 
theorized mainly by two schools of thought: restrictive and non-
restrictive positions.11 Through strictly adhering to the explicit 
wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter,12 the restrictive position 
conditions the legality of the resort to the right of self-defense on an 
actual attack by an adversary. This approach does not allow self-
defense in response to an imminent threat or instant political will-
formation. Based on international legal positivism, state practice13 is 
the major axiom in determining customary laws of self-defense, 
                                                 
 8 For instance see AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (Macmillan, 1906). 
 9 See David B Kopel, The natural right of self-defense: Heller’s lesson for 
the world, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 237 (2008). 
 10 Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self Defense in International 
Law, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 130 (2011). 
 11 See Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory self-defence under international law, 19 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 69 (2003). 
 12 ”Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations . . . “. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 13 To read about state practice and opinio juris see respectively SHAW, supra 
note 2, at 48, 52. 
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devoid of either opinio juris14 or moral standards. Article 38(1)(b) of 
the International Court of Justice’s statute defines customary law as 
“General Practice” accepted as law and gives no weight to the role of 
opinio juris.15 Strictly adhering to the notion of state practice in 
international norm-making, positivist thinkers give a static, state-
centric approach towards customary international law. So, under 
Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ, custom, based on state practice, may serve 
as law and justify any course of action that complies with the general 
practice accepted as law. 
On the other hand, the non-restrictive position sheds light on 
the importance of the instant custom and circumstantial realities 
shaping political will-formation rather than the actual armed attack 
launched by an adversary. This school of thought theoretically 
justifies the anticipatory self-defense under the notion of opinio juris, 
that does not necessarily comply with the wording of Article 51 and 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.16 Based on this understanding, in the 
wake of weapons of mass destruction that are mostly instantly 
deliverable, the fulfillment of the anticipatory self-defense is 
inevitable and even necessary to avoid being destroyed by instant 
deliverables.17 In other words, subjecting the right of self-defense to 
the actual armed attack by an adversary sounds irrational since actual 
attacks via devastating weapons of mass destruction will leave no 
time and capability for the state to respond and defend its territorial 
integrity. Therefore, the strict adherence of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter to the idea of state practice is in contrast with the inevitable 
and incontrovertible necessity of coping with instantly deliverable 
weapons of mass destruction before an actual armed attack by an 
adversary. 
                                                 
 14 Special state of mind of the actors on the basis of their intuitive grounds 
that shapes customary international law. 
 15 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187. 
 16 See Natalino Ronzitti, The Expanding Law of Self-Defense, 11 J. CONFLICT 
& SECURITY L. 343 (2006). 
 17 See Kalliopi Chainoglou, Reconceptualising Self-Defence in International Law, 
18 KING’S L. J. 61 (2007). 
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It is worthwhile to note that there has been controversy over 
the constituent elements of custom among scholars. Customary rules 
of law remain among the least definable concepts in national and 
international legal theories, though they remain as the building block 
of law in both spheres. “The critiques over the formation of 
customary law have been around for more than half a millennium. 
There is, if you will, no settled customary practice governing how to 
define customary rules of law.”18 Based on the Orthodoxian 
approach towards the nature of custom in international law, ‘custom 
is itself non-law (or pre-law) but can be a source of law when it is 
formalized and rationalized’.19 Based on this approach, custom is 
composed of state practice – behavioral patterns or opinio juris – and 
the subjective source or state of mind of the actor, or a rational 
combination of both, calling for a more reasonable and fit notion of 
customary law that lays out a reconciliation theory amidst the above-
stated debate.20 
In light of international law’s critique of indeterminacy, 
perplexity in international legal norm-identification,21 and improper 
function of international courts and tribunals in seeking to give 
weight and effect to identified values, states are gifted with leeway to 
act as judges in their own cause.22 This stream has provided them 
with the opportunity to render broad interpretations of the right of 
self-defense in international law and “legitimize” their military 
movements. This is why in the history of inter-polity relations, 
numerous non-defensive wars have been waged on non-aggressor 
                                                 
 18 Emily Kadens and Ernest A Young, How Customary Is Customary 
International Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 911 (2012). 
 19 Nicole Roughan, Democratic Custom v International Customary Law, 38 
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 403, 410 (2007). 
 20 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001). 
 21 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005). 
 22 Gonçalo de Almeida Ribeiro, Judicial Activism and Fidelity to Law, in 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 39 (Luís Pereira Coutinho et al. eds., 2015). 
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states, validated by the language of preemption but not empirically or 
even reasonably persuasive.23 
A. Restrictive Position towards the Right of Self-Defense in 
International Law 
1. The Theoretical Root 
A Positivistic approach toward international law had 
overwhelmingly been adopted following the dominance of 
empiricism in the Renaissance whereby “[law] was concerned not 
with an edifice of theory structured upon deductions from absolute 
principles, but rather with viewing events as they occurred and 
discussing actual problems that had arisen.”24 “Positivist Philosophy 
restricts the object of scientific knowledge to matters that can be 
verified by observation, and thus excludes from its domain all matters 
of an a priori, metaphysical nature.”25 So, the main pillar of positivistic 
legal philosophy is empiricism. The classical international legal 
positivism that was the dominant approach during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, has ostensibly become loose with resurgence of natural law 
theories.26 In the wake of the critical analysis of the religious ideology 
on the one hand, and the over-arching progress of the empirical 
observations on the other, a changeover in legal theory occurred. In 
the realm of international legal theory, positivism regained its 
                                                 
 23 As an example of such misinterpretations was reflected in the so-called 
Bush doctrine. Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. administration responded to 
pressure calling for a more offensive posture against so-called rogue troops by 
sending military troops and launching military attacks against military and non-
military people of Iraq in 2003. The Bush doctrine [which was formulated under 
the notion of instant custom] challenged even the idea of preventive war. 
According to the “Bush doctrine”, the reactive nature of the right of self-defense 
turns into an active one even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack. 
 24 SHAW, supra note 2, at 18. 
 25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 260, 261 (1940). 
 26 See id. at 262-68. 
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importance among scholars27 inspired by Hans Kelsen’s “Pure 
Theory of Law.”28 
Central to international legal positivism is what states do or 
consent to do, not what they ought to do. In other words, 
“[International legal positivism’s] essentialist positions follow from 
the problem of order amongst sovereigns, an order binding them. 
States are the original, pre-legal subjects of international law and an 
order binding them cannot come into being without or against their 
will.”29 Based on this value-free, conduct-based approach, only those 
norms which are generated by a man-made set of legal procedures are 
recognized as law, independent of any moral or inherent value. These 
arguments are mostly influenced by “the general realist thesis that 
based upon that, political morality does not reach beyond the 
boundaries of the state, or that only a very minimalist morality 
does.”30 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was one of the most well-
known thinkers who injected positivistic approach, based on egoism, 
into the laws of war.31 Morality, according to Hobbes, is an 
agreement between a sovereign and people living under that 
sovereignty. Through this agreement, people who are acting wholly 
on behalf of their self-interest, state their content-independent 
willingness to comply with the rules established by the sovereign.32 
So, to Hobbes, morality is a man-made creature enforced by a super-
power sovereign not given from a supernatural entity, such as God, 
or from nature itself. He transmitted this standpoint from his 
thoughts on domestic legal theory to the theories on the laws of war 
in inter-polity relations. In the absence of a super-sovereign in the 
                                                 
 27 Augusto Zimmermann, Evolutionary Legal Theories: The Impact of Darwinism 
on Western Conceptions of Law, 24 J. CREATION 108, 111 (2010). 
 28 See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 
Univ. Cal. Press 1967) (1934). 
 29 Jörg Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (2016). 
 30 Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, Introduction: The Emergence of the 
Philosophy of International Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
 31 See McMahan, supra note 30, at 494-95. 
 32 Id. 
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international sphere to enforce agreements among sovereigns, “states 
could not be morally constrained in their relations with each other.”33 
The Hobbesian approach gives room for dominant state-
actors to establish a prerogative to resort to war when they find it 
necessary for their interests. The Hobbesian account on the laws of 
war was dominant during the 19th and 20th centuries´ expansionism. 
The most invidious aftermaths of this approach were World Wars I 
and II, that faded in significance the theory of jus ad bellum34 -- a 
theory conditioning the legitimacy of launching a war against a state 
to a non-contentious just cause – and shifted in shedding light on the 
importance of the theory of jus in bello35 – laws on wartime conduct of 
the states engaging in a war. A piece by Amos Hershey in 1906 
provides a clear picture of this realistic understanding under the 
influence of the Hobbesian account on laws of war: 
”International law does not consider the justice or 
injustice of a war. From a purely legal standpoint, all 
wars are neither just nor unjust. International law 
merely takes cognizance of the existence of war as a 
fact, and prescribes certain rules and regulations 
which affect the rights and duties of neutrals and 
belligerents during that continuance.”36 
2. The Restrictive Position 
Positivism dispenses with moral weight and refutes 
unprecedented current customary understandings on what ought to 
be in international law. This idea is mostly inspired by Hart’s claim 
that informal and unofficial norms and authority structures are prone 
to inertia and anomy since they lack “secondary rules” that are 
                                                 
 33 Id. at 495. 
 34 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT 
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 63 (5th ed. 2015). 
 35 See generally PAUL CHRISTOPHER, Problems for International Law, in THE 
ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL AND MORAL ISSUES 
104-14 (3d ed. 2004). 
 36 HERSHEY, supra note 8, at 67. 
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adapting norms to changing circumstances.37 This follows from the 
principal positivist understanding that states are [considered] both 
principal producers and principal consumers of international law.38 
Based on that, the legitimacy of the fulfillment of the right of self-
defense in international law is restricted to an actual attack by the 
adversary or aggressor. 
Based on what is posited in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the 
use of self-defense should be preceded by an actual armed attack by 
an adversary.39 Strictly adhering to the wording of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, one cannot give legitimacy to the fulfillment of the right 
of self-defense in response to an imminent but not actual threat by an 
adversary. In other words, according to the Charter’s nature or 
restrictive position, the right of self-defense must be exercised only 
when one state objectively launches an attack against another. Given 
this, only a just-in-time defense could be legitimate in international 
law and covered by Article 51 and Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, and therefore, any interpretative method of norm 
identification on the basis of opinio juris such as preemptive self-
defense is illegitimate. 
Although a restrictive position may, at least in theory, remain 
a hurdle against illegitimate war creation in the international sphere, it 
is incapable of coping with weapons of mass destruction that are 
mostly instant deliverables. Reasonably, a state-actor must be capable 
of suppressing armed attacks before being devastated by these 
horrible weapons.40 This is why the non-restrictive position has 
gained greater momentum in the age of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
                                                 
 37 See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-99 (3d ed. 2012). 
 38 See generally ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2008). 
 39 See Russell Powell, The Law and Philosophy of Preventive War: An Institution-
Based Approach to Collective Self-Defence, 32 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 67 (2007). 
 40 See Kalliopi Chainoglou, Reconceptualising Self-Defence in International Law, 
18 K.L.J. 61, 76 (2007). 
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B. The Non-Restrictive Position towards the Right of Self-Defense 
in International Law 
1. The Theoretical Root 
Based on natural law theory, law, as an innate endowment, 
can be likened to the science of language that is a precious 
endowment bestowed upon mankind. This endowment is illuminated 
in practice by making different meaningful sounds through a well-
organized man-made process on the basis of association, analogy, 
and correspondence. Law, similarly, in its very essence, is a natural 
innate endowment bestowed on mankind, and comes into practice 
through man-made institutions and constitutions on the basis of 
motives and purposes of the consent which constituted them. 
“Natural law refers to rules and principles deducible from nature, 
reason or the idea of justice,”41 but in order for that to be 
implemented, it must be constituted by man. In other words, “It is 
undoubtedly true that the great body of the law is founded upon the 
dictates of the right reason, natural justice, and common sense.”42 So, 
the very nature and end of law is reasoning, logical fitness, and 
reasonableness. 
“The doctrine of the law of nature – first practically utilized 
in the administration of justice by the Roman jurists – whose 
primordial elements are uniformity, simplicity, harmony, and equality, 
and whose broadening influence upon the jurisprudence of the world 
has been so potent and permanent, is the doctrine of intrinsic 
reasonableness . . . It consists of a body of precepts which satisfy, and 
are in accord with, right human reason, and which are binding on all 
mankind by virtue of their inherent reasonableness.”43 But 
considering law, including international law, as a natural bestowment 
that can only be progressed through a participatory consent (custom), 
traces back to the writings of Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a 
Spanish theologian, in his Treaties on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in 
                                                 
 41 ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVIL, NATURAL AND CUSTOMARY LAW 71 
(2008), http://www.zaoerv.de/68_2008/68_2008_1_a_69_110.pdf. 
 42 Le Baron Bradford Colt, Law and Reasonableness, 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 658 
(1903). 
 43 Id. at 662. 
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which he “equated the law of nations with custom.”44 Based on this, 
jurisprudence and law, as sciences, consider their rules only as having 
their existence and authority by the appointment and institution of 
humanity, and refer to their fundamental causes as found in nature, 
only to explain their meaning and the extent of the power with which 
they were instituted. 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the founder of international law, 
first thought of applicability of moral and legal norms outside the 
polity.45 “For Grotius the law naturally provided both language and a 
mechanism for the systematic application of reason to problems 
social order and conflict”46 as well as complexities in inter-polity legal 
order. Accordingly, “[for Grotius] rights to self-defense, and certain 
property rights and contractual rights (all capable of being vested in 
individuals, sovereign states, and other entities), were embedded in 
Grotius’ natural law and applicable beyond [the territory of] any given 
polity.”47 Moreover, Grotius identified international law completely 
with the law of nature that echoes morality, reasonableness, and 
equity above and in advance of any posited statutory letters of law.48 
What states actually ought to do and the customs they ought 
to take into account are the inherent and key rule of the law of 
nature. What entails “ought to” is the common sense, driven by the 
common morality, of the community within which the law serves. 
This is why “theories of natural law are reflective critical accounts of 
the constitutive aspects of the well-being and fulfillment of human 
persons and the communities they form.”49 As a result, the stance of 
morality in natural law theory towards international law is of central 
importance. But the important question is how these moral values 
                                                 
 44 Kadens et al., supra note 12, at 887. 
 45 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: DE JURE BELLI AC 
PACIS LIBRI TRES, 3, (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925). 
 46 See BENEDICT KINGSBURY, A GROTIAN TRADITION OF THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: GROTIUS, LAW, AND MORAL SKEPTICISM IN THE THOUGHT OF 
HEDLEY BULL 11, 11 (1997), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=5584&context=faculty_scholarship. 
 47 Besson & Tasioulas, supra note 30, at 44. 
 48 See SHAW, supra note 2, at 18. 
 49 Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172 
(2008). 
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could be regulated and practically used in the international norm-
making process. Morally structured principles backed by 
philosophical notions are the missing keys in sketching international 
legal order and moral “ought to’s” in international law. This viewpoint 
has best been approached by Immanuel Kant’s account of 
international law. 
Based on the above-stated argument, the focal tenet of 
natural law is to bring existing rules into harmony with new, ever-
changing and probably unprecedented public or political sentiments 
under the formats of moral principles backed by philosophical 
notions. The criterion of reasonableness is best reflected in the 
Kantian approach towards international law. One of the tenets of the 
Kantian approach towards international law is that “international law 
must be institutionally designed to ensure the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.”50 
Kant, with his idea of perpetual peace, “intended to offer a 
programmatic formula for peace, rather than a philosophical analysis 
of the nature of international law and relations.”51 His approach was 
an attempt to pragmatically implement moral orders in relations 
among states. In sketching a moral sphere for states, he stresses the 
necessity of taking into account all reasonable measures in coping 
with adversaries.52 Therefore, he dismisses the vindication of any 
sense of just-war in international relations and persists on referring to 
philosophical notions of reasonableness and pragmatically 
implementing them as tenets of a just world order toward 
international law.53 
After the resurgence of the natural law theory in international 
legal order following World War II, morality has begun to be 
considered as a kernel in the international law agenda based on a 
transition from a state-centric global governance to one based on 
                                                 
 50 Patrick Capps, The Kantian Project in Modern International Legal 
Theory,12  EUR. J. INT’L. L. 1003, 1003 (2001). 
 51 Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 53, 57 (1992). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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human quest and humane anxiety.54 Therefore, many proposals have 
been rendered by academia for a newly evolved international law 
agenda calling for a world order based on equality, morality, and 
justice. 
2. The Non-Restrictive Position 
The proponents of the non-restrictive position shed light on 
the word “inherent” in the initial sentence of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense . . . “ They consider the 
right of self-defense to be an innate and morally justifiable right that 
cannot be nullified by any means, even by the UN Charter.55 In fact, 
they consider the right of self-defense as a natural endowment 
bestowed upon member states that come into practice through a 
man-made process on the basis of association, analogy, and 
correspondence. This naturally indispensable fact can be gleaned 
from the comment of the Secretary-General regarding the report by 
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes in 2005: 
“Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards 
the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against 
armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers 
imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.”56 
Based on this position, once a state actor is morally and 
politically convinced to resort to force in fulfillment of the right of 
self-help, it becomes a custom, based on opinio juris, and renders it as 
a norm in international law. So, the non-restrictive position does not 
require a state to suffer from the fearsome consequences of an actual 
armed attack before it can seek to defend itself from further attacks. 
This position accepts that a state anticipates the attack and acts in 
                                                 
 54 See RICHARD A. FALK, TOWARD HUMANE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: 
RHETORIC, DESIRE, AND IMAGINARIES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL 
GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONAL VISIONS FOR AN EVOLVING WORLD SYSTEM 
(2012). 
 55 See Ronzitti, supra note 16. 
 56 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (UNITED NATIONS), IN LARGER 
FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL, 
(UN Doc A/59/2005 (‘in larger Freedom’), 33 item 124, 2005). 
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such a manner as to preemptively neutralize the threat posed by the 
aggressor state. Therefore, this position justifies the use of self-
defense once a threat has become imminent but before an actual 
blow from an adversary has been executed. 
In the wake of the instant deliverables that have in most cases 
been instant, overwhelming, and left no moment for deliberation for 
the victim state, a natural desire of preemptive self-help has inevitably 
been set forth as a pragmatically reasonable interpretation of the 
international right of self-defense. The proponents of this standpoint 
argue that the first judicial articulation of anticipatory self-defense 
was pronounced in 1842 Caroline Case,57 which occurred long before 
the UN Charter came into existence. The advocates of this claim 
articulated a three-pronged criterion of immediacy, necessity, and 
proportionality as characters of a legitimate fulfillment of the 
anticipatory self-defense in international law. 
Given this, it has been argued that because of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a just-in-time defense 
may not work in an age of instant deliverables.58 Therefore, a state, or 
the elites of that state, are naturally entitled to do their best so as to 
not be harmed by their adversaries.59 Based upon this interpretation, 
anticipatory self-defense appears to be fully consistent with the 
nature of the right of self-help. In other words, the right of self-
                                                 
 57 In 1837, settlers in Upper Canada rebelled against the British colonial 
government. The United States remained officially neutral about the rebellion, but 
American sympathizers assisted the rebels with men and supplies, transported by a 
steamboat named the Caroline. In response, a British force from Canada entered 
United States territory at night, seized the Caroline, set the ship on fire, and sent it 
over Niagara Falls. At least one American was killed. The British claimed that the 
attack was an act of self-defense. In a letter to the British Ambassador, Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster argued that a self-defense claimant would have to show that 
the necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment of deliberation, and that the British force, even supposing 
the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United 
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the 
necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within 
it. 
 58 See Chainoglou, supra note 40, at 76. 
 59 See William H. Taft IV, International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 659, 659-62 (2004). 
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defense must be early enough to preclude devastation and gross harm 
and therefore, true anticipation is attached to the very process of self-
defense.”60 
As stated above, the non-restrictive position relies on the 
notion of opinio juris in legitimizing empirically unprecedented and 
instant customary international law. Under the dominance of the 
interpretative methods of norm identification, opinio juris, state 
practice, for the most part, retains merely an auxiliary function to 
determine opinio juris.61 For instance, in the field of international 
human rights, certain obligations such as the prohibition of genocide 
and slavery are universally known as customary norms without any 
constitutive reference to state practice or any precedential behavioral 
patterns.62 Koskenniemi argues that it is really our certainty that 
genocide or torture is illegal that allows us to understand state 
behavior and to accept or reject its legal message, not state behavior 
itself.63 This is why conditioning the identification of norms 
concerning fundamental moral principles on state practice is deemed 
inappropriate.64 
Based on the notion of instant custom, broad and permissive 
interpretations of the right of self-defense came into being based on 
the specific state of mind of the politically dominant actors when 
interpreting the law which did not necessarily comply with the 
wording of Article 51 and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.65 This has 
resulted in an unfathomable confusion about the dual customary-
Charter nature of the right of self-defense.66 In practice, some legally 
                                                 
 60 William. H. Taft, The Legal Basis for Preemption (2002) Council on 
Foreign Relations Memorandum: 17 November 2005. N 45. 333, 
http://zionadvocate.com/the-legal-basis-for-preemption/. 
 61 See Niels Petersen, Customary Law without Custom-Rules, Principles, and the 
Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275 (2007) 
 62 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946 
(1990). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Petersen, supra note 61. 
 65 See Ronzitti, supra note 16. 
 66 See Terry D Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: Anticipation, Pre-
Emption, Prevention and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 113, 113 (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2007) 
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untenable instances of the fulfillment of the right of self-defense, 
such as the so-called “Bush Doctrine,” were the result of such broad 
interpretations that relied on instant custom. This is why many 
scholars have argued that this natural and inevitable understanding of 
the right of self-defense, without a regulatory criterion in 
international law, may result in unreasonable and irrecoverable 
incidents67 and potentially will result in departure from strict rules of 
law. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CORE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
In June 2010 in Kampala, Uganda, states party to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) agreed to make amendments to 
the Rome Statute and bring the international core crime of 
Aggression within the court’s jurisdiction, beginning in 2017.68 In 
detail, the Resolution, RC/Res.6, states that these amendments enter 
into force in accordance with Article 121.5 of the Rome Statute, 
meaning for each ratifying state individually, one year after the 
deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance.69 For the Court 
to actively exercise jurisdiction over the crime of Aggression, 
however, the amendments stipulate additional conditions: the 
amendments must have been ratified or accepted for one year by at 
least thirty State Parties, and in addition State Parties must “activate” 
the Court’s jurisdiction through an additional decision to be taken on 
or after January 1, 2017 by a two-thirds majority.70 
The international core crime of Aggression, defined in Article 
8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC,71 is essentially the offense of using 
                                                 
 67 See Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, Problems of “subjective imputation” in domestic 
and international criminal law, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. J. 311 (2014). 
 68 ROME STATUTE REVIEW CONFERENCE - KAMPALA, 
UGANDA, 31 May- 11 June 2010 
 69 Resolution RC/Res.6, Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June 
2010, by consensus. 
 70 See Roger S Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Considered at the first Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May - 
11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 689 (2010). 
 71 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, signed on 17 July 
1998. Article 8: 
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force against another state without justification under international 
law. In detail, the actus resus of the international core crime of 
Aggression is the unlawful use of force which is rejected by the rules 
of international law. Moreover, the perpetrator and the victim of this 
crime are limited to states. The mens rea of this crime is an 
intentionally illegal use of force with a particular intention to 
encroach victim state’s territory. In result, the international core crime 
of Aggression is merely committable by states against states. In other 
words, under the auspices of this definition, the international core 
crime of Aggression is a leadership crime, thus not applying to 
                                                 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a 
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion 
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
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ordinary soldiers and other individuals.72 Moreover, only certain acts 
amount to the international core crime of Aggression, namely to the 
extent that the act “by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”73 
As elaborated above, there has been an unfathomable and 
unresolved controversy over the customary-Charter puzzle of self-
defense in international law. Given the prevalence of positivistic 
interpretations on the very nature of customary law and also the right 
of self-defense in international law, use of force (Article (2) (4) of the 
UN Charter) has been legitimized only on behalf of defensive 
purposes. In other words, “Article 2(4) of the UN Charter places 
some limitations on the use of force by states in the everyday conduct 
of their international relations, without however going so far as to 
prohibit states from maintaining standing armies for purely defensive 
purposes.”74 However, if a state uses military force, and by doing so 
aggresses the territorial integrity of another state, without resorting a 
justificatory mean such as the right of self-defense, it can be 
prosecuted for committing the international core crime of Aggression 
as of 2017.75 This is why “the crime of Aggression is extremely 
controversial.”76 
The indeterminate terms “gravity”, “character”, and “scale” 
in the explicit wording of Article 8 of the Rome Statute have been 
subject to controversy among scholars.77 “Gravity” and “scale” may 
point to the extent of an armed attack, and thus exclude mere border 
incursions of the type frequent in anti-terrorist warfare beyond 
borders.78 “Character” seems to be a vaguer term; it seems to leave 
                                                 
 72 See Andreas Paulus, Second thoughts on the crime of aggression, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L. L. 1117 (2009). 
 73 See supra note 62. 
 74 Rothwell, supra note 6, at 338. 
 75 See supra note 74. 
 76 Michael P Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 357, 359 (2012) 
 77 See Paulus, supra note 73. 
 78 See Christian J Tams, The use of force against terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
359 (2009). 
2018 Incongruence between Self-Defense and the Core Crime of Aggression 6:1 
199 
room for arbitrary interpretations of what the term “character” 
entails.79 
These terms seem to be useful in distinguishing between 
committing the international core crime of Aggression and 
interventionism calling for humanitarian assistance. “Recent attempts 
to legalize humanitarian intervention seem to have failed: while 
attempting a codification of sorts of the concept of the ‘responsibility 
to protect’, the UN Summit of 200580 clearly reserved the reaction to 
the non-observance of the responsibility of states to protect their 
populations from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, and genocide, to the UN, in particular the Security 
Council.”81 What marks the distinction between humanitarian and 
pro-democratic interventionism and the international core crime of 
Aggression is the specific mens rea of the latter that is deductible from 
the gravity, scale, and character of the crime committed. 
A. Aggression or Self-Defense? 
As described above, the right of self-defense, as one of the 
two justifications of the legality of the use of force, is under deep-
rooted conceptual doubt. Any misuse of the right of self-defense by 
state actors forms the actus reus of the crime of Aggression. So, the 
right of self-defense being arbitrarily interpreted can, in practice, lead 
to devastating consequences, as of 2017, which marks the creation of 
the crime of Aggression under ICC jurisdiction. 
For example, if state “A” misinterprets the anticipatory 
perspective of the right of self-defense and uses force against the 
territorial integrity of state “B” on the basis of a non-imminent 
threat, the aggressor state will scape justice and responsiveness before 
any criminal court including ICC. So, in the wake of the customary-
Charter perplexity of the right of self-defense in international law, the 
                                                 
 79 See supra note 83. 
 80 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (2005), at ¶139; 
see also SC Res. 1674 (2006), at ¶ 4; SC Res 1706 (2006), at preambular ¶ 2; 
implementing the responsibility to protect see SG report, 12 Jan. 2009, A/63/677 
(2009), at ¶ 9–10. 
 81 See Paulus, supra note 73, at 1122. 
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practical existence of the crime of Aggression, to a large extent, 
would be affected by arbitrariness and bewilderment. Moreover, this 
will make room for the dominant political actors to tag legally tenable 
resorts to the right of self-defense with the crime of “Aggression” on 
the basis of their own political interests. 
Human conduct is intrinsically constituted and driven by 
subjective presuppositions and premises, or the state of mind of the 
actor. Aristotle’s account of practical syllogism82 can be construed as 
providing a statement of natural conditions for intelligible human 
action and doing so in a way that must hold for any recognizably 
human culture.83 Based on this universal concept, the primary 
element of any act in any sphere is the state of mind of the actor or 
the subjective element. 
Based on this universal concept on human conduct, no one 
can refute the special state of mind of the actors, opinio juris, in times 
of being threatened by a potential adversary that is imminently about 
to launch a military attack. Given this, it is intrinsically 
incontrovertible and correct to prioritize the subjective element or 
special state of mind of the actors in international laws of self-
defense. Therefore, broad, instant, and self-interested interpretations 
                                                 
 82 The Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to Aristotle’s best-
known work on ethics. The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining 
Aristotelian ethics, consists of ten books. This work was written Between 334 and 
323 B.C. See BARTLETT, ROBERT C, AND COLLINS, SUSAN D., ARISTOTLE’S 
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS: A NEW TRANSLATION (2011). 
 83 Aristotle’s account of Practical Syllogism is briefly touched as following: 
I. Presupposed will -- intentions and goals that are presupposed but not expressed 
by the principal – such as believing in the fact that a state has the right to defend 
itself, 
II. Major premise -- a universal truth or a moral maxim on a specific matter – such 
the fact that use of force can be permitted in case of fulfillment of the right of self-
defense, whether this right be legitimized by instant custom or Charter, 
III. Minor premise -- a particular truth or instance covered by the major premise – 
such as the instance that the adversary state (A) is launching an actual attack against 
state (B), or has shown its willingness to use WMD. So, State (B) has the right to 
defend its territorial integrity and public security, whether it be legitimized by 
instant custom or Charter, 
IV. Conclusion – the imperative action – such as when State (B) fulfills its right to 
self-defense. 
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on behalf of the right of self-defense under the category of 
anticipatory self-defense are inherently inevitable. This is a natural 
extension that is fully consistent with universal propensity of not 
being harmed by even a potential adversary. 
As stated above, in the absence of a written law valuing, and 
at the same time regulating opinio juris in international laws of self-
defense, customary international law, primarily based on opinio juris, is 
of intrinsic priority in recognizing the legitimate fulfillment of the 
right of self-defense. But given the indeterminacy of international 
law, there are profound critiques on the nature of customary 
international law itself, for it makes opinio juris rather hazardous that 
makes room for dominant international actors to act on their own 
cause and remain unquestioned. And this has the potential for 
misinterpretations regarding the actus reus of the international core 
crime of Aggression before criminal courts. In other words, although 
this crime has been directed to bring aggressor states before criminal 
courts, given the customary-Charter puzzle of the right of self-
defense, the crime of Aggression sounds like a new pretext for more 
wars under new headings. This is why this research is aimed at 
necessitating the conceptual re-thinking of the right of self-defense 
prior to practically bringing the crime of Aggression under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC in 2017. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The explicit wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter is 
completely in contrast to the natural and logical process of human 
conduct. Article 51 of the UN Charter conditions the legitimacy of 
the fulfillment of the right of self-defense to an actual armed attack 
objectively launched by the adversary. This huge flaw has resulted in 
various interstate hostilities and a transparent departure from the rule 
of law on behalf of the fulfillment of the right of self-defense. 
On the other hand, arguably, opinio juris is central to the very 
structure of the right of self-defense as a human (re)action. 
Therefore, Article 51 of the UN Charter remains theoretically 
dysfunctional. This has provided a deep-rooted perplexity on the 
nature and legitimate practice of the right of self-defense in 
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international law. Thus, in the current international legal structure, 
the international right of self-defense suffers from a conceptual 
deficit that makes the actus reus of the international core crime of 
Aggression highly indeterminate. 
Based on the main argument of this article, it is extremely 
crucial for the international law-making apparatus to re-think the 
conceptual flaws of the right of self-defense before giving practical 
weight to the crime of Aggression. The reason for this is that the 
right of self-defense in international law and the crime of Aggression 
are intrinsically interconnected. Any malpractice on behalf of the 
fulfilment of the right of self-defense in international law forms actus 
reus of the international core crime of Aggression which, based on the 
Article 8 of the ICC Rome Statute, is merely committable by states 
against states. Therefore, the customary-Charter puzzle of the right 
of self-defense, coupled with the practice of the international core 
crime of Aggression as of 2017, provides room for an indeterminate 
and misinterpreted account of the crime of Aggression. 
 
